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Conway: Defendant's Right to Inspect Written Statements of Prosecution Wi
NOTES
for injury to or loss of a vessel, detention and demurrage, loss of
cargo, and interest in the discretion of the court. But the courts have
avoided the injustices of a rigid application of this rule by developing
several exceptions. These include the rules of gross fault, error in
extremis, inevitable accident, and inscrutable fault.
EDWARD H. FiELD
BERNARD C. MUSZYNSKI

DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO INSPECT WRITTEN
STATEMENTS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES
Cross-examination "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth,"' and one of its important
functions is to challenge the veracity of witnesses. An effective means
of doing this is to prove that the witness, on prior occasions, has made
2
statements that are inconsistent with his testimony given at the trial.
This is difficult for the defendant, however, when proof of the suspected prior statements is in the possession of the prosecution.
The great majority of American jurisdictions do not require pretrial disclosure of these documents.' But, with reference to inspection during the trial, a slight majority of the states that have passed
on the question either require that inspection be permitted when it
is alleged that the prior statements are contradictory to a witness's
trial testimony4 or allow the trial judge to grant inspection at his
discretion. 5 A number of American jurisdictions deny the accused
15 VIGMORE, EVIDENCE 29
2in

(3d ed. 1940).

Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 (1957), the Court said: "Flat

contradictions between the witness' testimony and the version of the events given
in his reports is not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from the reports
of facts related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even
a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of
testing the credibility of a witness' trial testimony."
WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §671 (12th ed. 1955).
4E.g., People v. Salimone, 265 Mich. 486, 251 N.W. 594 (1933); State v. Bachman,
41 Nev. 197, 168 Pac. 733 (1917); Kilpatrick v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. 391, 189 S.W.
267 (1916).
&E.g., State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A.2d 895 (1941); People v. Murphy, 412
111. 458, 107 N.E.2d 748 (1952); People v. Fleisher, 322 Mich. 474, 34 N.W.2d 15
(1948); Linder v. State, 156 Neb. 504, 56 N.W.2d 734 (1953); State v. Winne, 27
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the right to inspect at any time.6
In Gordon v. United States7 the United States Supreme Court, in
discussing the right of a defendant to make a pretrial inspection of
written statements made by government witnesses to government
agents, said: 8
"In the absence of specific legislation, questions of this
nature are governed 'by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience.' Apparently, earlier common law did not permit the accused to require production of
such documents. Some state jurisdictions still recognize no
comprehensive right to see documents in the hands of the
prosecution merely because they might aid in the preparation
or presentation of the defense."
INSPECTION IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES

Pretrial
A federal statute, enacted during the 1957 session of Congress, in
part provides: 9
"In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no
statement or report in the possession of the United States
which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government witnesses (other than the defendant) to an agent of
the Government shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or
inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination
in the trial of the case."
Prior to the enactment of this statute, only the Court of Appeals
N.J. Super. 304, 99 A.2d 368 (App. Div. 1953); Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587,
597, 199 P.2d 897, 902 (1948) (dictum).
6E.g., People v. Humphries, 127 Cal. App.2d 131, 273 P.2d 562 (1954); State v.
Laird, 79 Kan. 681, 100 Pac. 637 (1909); State v. Williams, 216 La. 419, 43 So.2d
780 (1949); State v. Hall, 55 Mont. 182, 175 Pac. 267 (1918); State v. Rhoads, 81
Ohio 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910).
7344 U.S. 414 (1953).
s1d. at 418.
918 U.S.C. §3500 (a) (1957).
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for the District of Columbia had granted pretrial discovery and inspection of a prospective government witness's written statements,
under the provisions of Rule 17 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure;' 0 numerous federal courts had denied inspection of witnesses' statements under the same rule,"' which applies to discovery
procedure.
Several federal district courts have construed the 1957 case of
Jencks v. United States,'2 discussed infra, as authority for requiring
the prosecution to allow defendants to inspect witnesses' statements; 1"
others have held that the Jencks case did not involve pretrial inspection and is not authority for requiring such inspection.' 4 The decisions requiring pretrial inspection on the basis of Jencks were cited
by the Senate Judiciary Committee as examples of widespread "misinterpretations and misunderstandings" of Jencks by the lower federal
courts, which necessitated the enactment of the statute, a portion of
which is quoted above.' 5 The statute apparently leaves no room for
any interpretation, either of the Jencks case or of Federal Rule 17 (c),
that would allow or require pretrial inspection of witnesses' statements by the defendant.
The 1957 statute concerning inspection was not intended to apply
to a transcript of testimony given before a grand jury: "It is the
specific intent of the bill to provide for production only of written
statements .

.

. made by the witness to a Federal Law Officer."' w Al-

though one circuit court of appeals has held that grand jury testimony is subject to inspection under the Jencks case,' 7 Rule 6 (e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was not involved
in the Jencks case, leaves the inspection of transcripts of grand jury
testimony to the discretion of the trial court. Under this rule pretrial inspection of a witness's testimony before a grand jury may be
loFryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 885
(1953).
"aE.g., United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Brown, 17 F.R.D. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1955); United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431 (N.D.
Cal. 1954).
12353 U.S. 657 (1957).
13US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1861 (1957).
'4United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813 (D.NJ. 1957); United States v.
Anderson, 154 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1957); State v. Thompson, 134 A.2d 266
(Del. 1957).
15U.S. CODE CONG.

& An. NEws, supra note 13.

'GIbid.

'7United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957).
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granted only "upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion
to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the
grand jury."
During the Trial
In Goldman v. United States18 a government witness made a written statement which became part of the government files and which
he subsequently used to refresh his memory before the trial. The Supreme Court held that, in denying the defendant inspection of the
statement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
In Gordon v. United States-9 the Court held that it was prejudicial
error to deny defendant the right to inspect a government witness's
prior written statement when the witness admitted that the statement
was contradictory to his testimony during the trial. This opinion
stressed the fact that the defendant had laid a foundation of inconsistency by showing that specific statements existed, that such statements were in the possession of the prosecution, and that they were
contradictory to the witness's trial testimony. The Court distinguished
the Goldman case, pointing out that the notes in that case had not
been shown to be inconsistent with the witness's testimony.
These two cases appeared to stand for the proposition that the
trial judge can use his discretion in granting or denying inspection,
except when a proper foundation of inconsistency is laid by the defendant. 2° But this interpretation of the cases was expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court, and the Goldman case impliedly
overruled, in Jencks v. United States, which held:21
"[The petitioner was not required to lay a preliminary foundation of inconsistency, because a sufficient foundation was
established by the testimony of Matusow and Ford that their
reports were of the events and activities related in their testimony."
22
The Court elaborated on this point by saying:

1s316 U.S. 129 (1942).
19344 U.S. 414 (1953).
2oJencks v. United States, 266 F.2d 540, 552 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 657
(1957).

21353 U.S. 657, 666 (1957).
22d. at 667.
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"Requiring the accused first to show conflict between the
reports and the testimony is actually to deny the accused evidence relevant and material to his defense. The occasion for
determining a conflict cannot arise until after the witness has
testified, and unless he admits conflict, as in Gordon, the accused is helpless to know or discover conflict without inspecting
the reports. A requirement of a showing of conflict would be
dearly incompatible with our standards for the administration
of criminal justice in the Federal Courts and must therefore
be rejected."
The Court also expressly disapproved the practice of "producing
government documents to the trial judge for his determination of
,,23The
relevancy and materiality, without hearing the accused .
Court further indicated that if the Government refuses to allow the
accused to inspect documents when inspection is ordered, it must
let the defendant go free.
Three judges, of the eight sitting,24 disagreed with the majority
opinion. Justices Burton and Harlan, concurring in the result,
pointed out that the "petitioner requested only that the records be
produced to the trial court," 25 and felt that he was entitled to no more
than he had asked for. Justice Clark, dissenting, agreed with Justices
Burton and Harlan that the right of the defendant to inspect such
documents should be left to the discretion of the trial judge.26
The Constitution is not mentioned in the Jencks case, and in
all probability the Court's authority for reversal lay in its general
supervisory power over inferior federal courts and not on constitutional grounds. Some of the language used is suggestive of "due
process of law": "clearly incompatible with our standards of justice,"
"justice requires no less." The Court's prior decisions indicate, however, that denial of inspection is not a violation of due process. 27
In any event, this discussion of the Florida and federal law assumes
that the Jencks decision was not based on constitutional grounds.
The decision in the Jencks case caused an immediate unfavorable
reaction from both the executive and legislative branches of the
231d. at 669.
24Mr. Justice Whittaker did not participate.
25Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957).
26353 U.S. 657, 680.

27See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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federal government. An extreme example of the reaction is the fol2
lowing excerpt from a statement by Senator Jenner:
"[Wihat else is the Court saying there, if it is not saying this:
'We can trust Communists. We can trust criminals. But we
cannot trust the trial judges of our own Federal bench?'
"Every Senator knows the dismay this ruling caused to the
whole investigating and prosecuting apparatus of the Federal
Government. Every Senator knows that the Attorney General
had to come before us immediately, asking for legislation to
keep traitorous and criminal hands out of FBI files."
Apparently Congress agreed with Justice Clark's statement that if
this decision were not overruled the government agencies engaged
in law enforcement might as well "close up shop." 29 Less than three

months after the Jencks decision was announced, Congress passed, by
an overwhelming majority, a bill to modify that decision.
This statute provides that after a witness for the prosecution testifies on direct examination, the defendant is entitled to inspect the
witness's prior written statements 30 that were made to a government
agent and are in the possession of the Government. However, if the
Government contends that any part of the statement does not relate
to the witness's testimony, the court will examine the document and
shall excise the portions which are not relevant and then order the
statement delivered to the defendant. 31 This provision removes one
of the major objections to the Jencks decision: that the entire statement could contain state secrets or other confidential information not
related to the case in which inspection was ordered. It will be remembered that the Jencks case expressly disapproved the "practice of
producing government documents to the trial judge for his determination of relevancy and materiality .... ,32 The statute further provides
that the trial court may recess the trial to give the defendant a
2SHearing before Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1957).
29Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 681 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
30"Statement" is defined to include any written statement signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by the witness, as well as any stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording, or a transcript thereof, which is substantially a verbatim
recital of an oral statement made to a government agent.
3118 U.S.C. §3500 (1957).
32353 U.S. at 669.
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reasonable time to examine the statement and prepare for using it in
his defense.
By dictum in the Jencks case33 the defendant must be freed if the
Government refuses to comply with an order to allow inspection. But
the new statute allows the trial court either to strike the witness's
testimony from the record and proceed with the trial or grant a mistrial at its discretion.
INSPECTION IN FLORIDA CRIMINAL CASES

Pretrial
In McAden v. State the Florida Supreme Court held that a witness's
statement made in writing to the state's attorney could not be subpoenaed by the defendant prior to the trial.34 The Court said:35
"We are not familiar with any statute or rule of law making
it the duty of a State Attorney or his assistants to deliver to
counsel for defendant a transcript of testimony of state witnesses
taken or made at a conference had or held between the State
Attorney and Assistants and the State's witnesses."
The basis for the Court's decision in the McAden case is not
clearly stated, but it appears that the Court concluded that the
statements were the state's attorney's private papers or memoranda and
thus not subject to inspection. The Court distinguished McAden from
a prior Florida case, State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell,36 in which inspection of testimony given before a grand jury had been allowed, by
stating: "The petition for subpoena duces tecum failed to allege that
the desired transcript was a public document."37 Justices Terrell,
Adams and Buford, dissenting, felt that this distinction should not be
drawn, and that "the case at bar is ruled by and should be reversed
on authority of [the Brown case]." 38
The basis for the McAden decision becomes particularly signifi331d. at 680.

34155 Fla. 523, 21 So.2d 33 (1945). See also McIntosh v. State, 139 Fla. 863, 192
So. 183 (1939).
35155 Fla. 523, 527, 21 So.2d 33, 35 (1945).
36123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936).
37155 Fla. 523, 527, 21 So.2d 33, 35 (1945).
sId.at 529, 21 So.2d at 36.
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cant in view of the decision of the Court in a later case, Smith v.
State, in which the Court, holding that written statements made to
the state's attorney are not private papers or memoranda, said: 31
"[T]he State Attorney is a constitutional officer .. . .It is not
the duty of a State Attorney merely to secure convictions; ...
it is his duty to present all of the material facts known to him
to the jury; ...being an arm of the Court he is charged with
the duty of assisting the Court to see that justice is done, and
not to assume the role of persecutor. .. IThe testimony of
a witness given before a State Attorney (acting in his official
capacity as State Attorney, vested by law with the power to
compel attendance of witnesses before him) falls in the same
category with testimony taken before a committing magistrate
....
" (Emphasis added).
This categorizing of statements made to the state's attorney as public
documents apparently removes the major reason for the Court's
40
refusal of pretrial inspection in the McAden case.
It is true that the Smith case involved a request for inspection
made during the trial, but the fact remains that the Court's rationale
in the McAden case lay not in the time of the request for inspection
but in the determination that the statement in question was part
of the "private papers" of the prosecutor; such statements were held
to be nonprivate in the Smith case. The time of request for inspection should have nothing to do with the nature of the papers in
question. However, if the Florida Supreme Court does grant the
defendant a right to inspect these statements, it appears that inspection will be allowed only when the documents are shown to be "material and necessary to the defendant's case. "41
During the Trial
The Florida Supreme Court has upheld the defendant's right to
inspect prior written statements when they are used or referred to by
the prosecution during trial. In Smith v. State the Court held:42
3995 So.2d 525, 527 (Fla. 1957).
40See Drozewski v. State, 84 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1956), a case in which the trial
court granted a pretrial inspection of prospective witnesses' written statements.
4lMcIntosh v. State, 139 Fla. 863, 192 So. 183 (1939).
4295

So.2d 525, 527 (Fla. 1957).
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"[I]t was error for the Trial Court to allow the State Attorney
to use this transcript of the testimony for the purpose of impeaching the witness, Boyce, without allowing the witness and
defendant's counsel to inspect the transcript, and if counsel
for the defense so desired, to introduce in evidence the whole
transcript for the purpose of explaining away, clarifying, or
distinguishing the alleged inconsistencies."
The defendant's rights, when the prior statement is not used by
the prosecution, have not been discussed by the Court. The Smith
case held that statements made by prospective witnesses are not private
papers or memoranda. If this is true, it should be immaterial whether
the prosecution used the statement in questioning the witness during
the trial or not. Although the rationale is applicable, the Smith case
is distinguishable on its facts from the principal problem concerning
prior statements of government witnesses. Here the statements in the
prosecutor's possession were made by a defense witness and were
used by the prosecutor on cross-examination.
If the testimony of witnesses at the preliminary hearing is reduced
to writing at the request of the state's attorney, the defendant is entided to a copy without cost to him. 4 3 In Williams v. State44 the
Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court, in its discretion to
control the process of proof, could properly refuse to allow such a
transcript to be introduced in evidence for impeachment purposes
when the court reporter who transcribed the statements was available
to testify.
The testimony of a witness before a grand jury may be reached
by subpoenaing the official court reporter who transcribed the testimony and compelling him to produce it.45 If the state denies that
the requested portion of the transcript of the grand jury testimony
is material, the trial court must examine the testimony to determine
its materiality.46 However, the defendant is not entitled to examine
the grand jury testimony of witnesses who are not called by the prose4
cution during the trial. 7
Finally, it should be noted that the witness's written statements
(1957).
4474 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1954).
45Trafficante v. State, 92 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1957). See also State ex rel. Brown v.
Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936).
46Trafficante v. State, 92 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1957).
47Richards v. State, 144 Fla. 177, 197 So. 772 (1940).
43FLA. STAT. §902.11

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1958], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

in the possession of the defense attorney may be used by the defense
in cross-examining the state's witnesses without being shown to the
prosecution. 4 1 These statements are considered to be the defense attorney's private papers or memoranda. It is error for the trial court
to strike the testimony elicited by the use of such statements when
defense counsel refuses to allow the prosecuting attorney to inspect
them.

49

CONCLUSION

Any rule governing the right of a defendant to inspect the written
statements of a witness should recognize the legitimate interests of
both the government and the accused. In federal prosecutions it is
of the utmost importance that state secrets, such as the identity of
undercover agents, be withheld from suspected communists and criminals. But at the same time the defendant has a legitimate interest
in cross-examining government witnesses about their prior statements
to government agents.
Perhaps the most beneficial result of the Jencks case was that it
focused the attention of Congress on this problem and in effect forced
a comprehensive study of it, resulting in a desirable law on the subject. Although the Jencks decision fully protected the defendant's
interests, it failed to shield the Government's secrets; the statute
represents an attempt to balance these conflicting interests. It allows
the defendant to inspect only those statements by government witnesses that are pertinent to their testimony against him. The trial
judge decides, subject to appellate review, what statements are so related. Both the Government and the defendant are protected by the
provision that the Government may refuse inspection but in so doing
loses the right to use the testimony of the witness.
In state prosecutions, however, the same interests are not involved.
Speaking of the majority decision in the Jencks case, Justice Clark in
his dissent said:50
"This may well be a reasonable rule in state prosecutions where
none of the problems of foreign relations, espionage, sabotage,
subversive activities, counterfeiting, internal security, national
defense, and the like exist . ..

."

48Whitaker v. Blackburn, 74 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1954).
4
9Urga v. State, 85 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1956).
5o353 U.S. 657, 682 (1957).
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The state courts that refuse inspection of witnesses' statements generally give two reasons for their refusal: (1) the barren technicality that
such statements are the prosecution's private papers or memoranda;
and (2) the timeworn reason, which has been used to impede many
changes in judicial proceedings, that it would open the doors to fraud
and perjury. The first reason fails to distinguish between the attorney's private notes or working memoranda and a verbatim transcript of a prospective witness's sworn statement, which the prosecuting attorney has secured as insurance against the witness changing
his story at the trial. The second rationale, as pointed out by Wigmore, 51 has been shown to be fallacious in many other areas.
It may be argued that the defendant is free to take statements
from witnesses, just as is the prosecution. This argument presumes
too many doubtful factors. Many defendants can not afford the expense of taking statements from witnesses. The accused, if innocent,
may not even know who the witnesses will be. Even if he does, he
has no means of compelling a witness to make a statement.
Many courts have pointed out that the prosecuting officer is
charged with securing justice, not merely convictions. If a prior statement is consistent with the trial testimony, why should the prosecution
object to an inspection? If the trial testimony is inconsistent with the
statement, does not justice require that this be brought to the attention of the jury? Should not a prosecutor, interested in securing justice, voluntarily provide the defense with this information? Is a conviction on the basis of inconsistent testimony compatible with any
concept of justice? The answers to these questions demand the conclusion that an accused should be allowed to inspect a witness's prior
written statements when they are in the possession of the prosecutor or some other government agent.
The granting of pretrial inspection could, conceivably, present
the accused with an opportunity to bribe or intimidate witnesses, or
to gather perjured testimony. Yet a guilty defendant already knows
the prosecution's case and needs no help in presenting a perjured
or bribed defense.52 "Seemingly, the only way to keep a guilty defendant from preparing a false defense is to conceal from him the
fact that he is charged with crime."5 3 But the innocent defendant may
have little knowledge of the case against him, and the jury's verdict as
51EVmENCE §§1859, 1863 (3d ed. 1940).
52
Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 633 n.55 (1951).

S3Ibid.
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